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The Metastable City and the Politics of 
Crystallisation: Protesting and Policing in 
Kampala
Joschka Philipps and Jude Kagoro 
Abstract: When protests break out in downtown Kampala they tend to 
transform a fluid urban environment into bounded political camps, and 
myriad ambiguous concerns into comparatively clear-cut political issues. 
This article traces this process and conceptualises Kampala’s urban poli-
tics as a politics of crystallisation: as attempts to structure highly fluid 
dynamics into something concrete. The article is based on ethnographic 
research amongst opposition activists and the police forces. Both seek to 
activate political boundaries and make people gravitate towards their 
respective side. But in line with the fluidity of urban everyday life, they 
also work and collaborate across these boundaries. The national regime 
and the opposition thus function not as permanent, stable structures, but 
as processes, as fields of gravity whose emergence is incited and inhib-
ited, financed, and policed. Drawing on Gilbert Simondon’s theory of 
individuation and AbdouMaliq Simone’s work on urbanity, this analytical 
framework offers a dynamic reading of urban contentious politics in 
general, and a reinterpretation of the paradoxes of power in African 
politics in particular. 
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Hybrid regimes embody “paradoxes of power,” Tripp (2010: 9) argues; 
they exhibit divergent realities “depending on what processes or actors 
one is analyzing.” As Tripp shows, Uganda is an exemplary case in this 
regard. On first sight, for instance, the Ugandan state, dominated for 
over 30 years by the National Resistance Movement (NRM) under Presi-
dent Museveni, seems extremely stable. Internationally backed as a geo-
strategic ally of the United States, nationally supported by a wealthy 
business elite, equipped with a massive security apparatus (Kagoro 2014), 
the state institutions and the governing party are fully intertwined in an 
intricate political patronage system that secures the overall status quo. At 
the same time, however, there is a widespread sense of instability within 
“the political matrix in Uganda,” which is “fluid and constantly chang-
ing,” resulting in a variety of frictions within the NRM and indicating 
that “the biggest threats to the NRM’s power emanate from those clos-
est to Museveni” (Tripp 2010: 64, 56). Instability also emerges from 
outside the regime. The Kayunga riots in 2009, the Walk-to-Work pro-
tests in 2011, and the deadly clashes between opposition supporters and 
police during the 2016 election campaigns have manifested profound 
tensions and frustrations among large parts of the urban population, 
who feel marginalised from the supposedly ubiquitous national devel-
opment and enraged by widespread corruption. And yet, to add another 
paradox, “corruption” and “Big Man politics” (Utas 2012) also tended to 
be intricately engrained in the very dynamics of popular resistance 
(Philipps 2016).  
Africanist political sociology is shot through with such contradic-
tions, or, one should specify: paradoxes and contradictions have become 
a prominent way for academics to frame African political and social 
dynamics. The discussion on African youth was particularly explicit in 
this regard, with key titles conceiving youth as Makers and Breakers (Hon-
wana and de Boeck 2005b), Vanguard or Vandals (Abbink and van Kessel 
2005), and Hooligans and Heroes (Perullo 2005), highlighting that “children 
and youth are extremely difficult to pin down analytically [because] they 
often occupy more than one position at once” (Honwana and de Boeck 
2005a: 3; see also Philipps 2014). But even the foundational discussion in 
the 1980s and 1990s on “the African state” (e.g. Médard 1982; Bayart 
1993; Chabal and Daloz 1999) versus an African “civil society” and Afri-
can social movements (e.g. Harbeson, Rothchild, and Chazan 1994; 
Mamdani and Wamba-dia-Wamba 1995) have demonstrated profusely 
how divergent, heterogeneous, and sometimes contradictory the realities 
are that emerge from African polities in the academic disciplines that 
reflect on them. In that empirical and academic context, Tripp (2010: 9-10) 
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finds it problematic that “the limitations of social science […] make 
embracing two contradictory realities at the same time nearly impossible, 
[when] that is what hybrid regimes require of us.”  
In this paper, which focuses on protests and policing in Kampala, 
we hope to provide a theoretical-methodological framework that makes 
embracing contradictory realities easier.1 Based on the work of French 
philosopher Gilbert Simondon (Combes 2013; Simondon 1958, 1989, 
1995), the key idea is to think of realities not in terms of “objects and 
substances” (Lakoff and Johnson 2003: 25) – for contradictions become 
problematic when one “thing” also appears to be something else – but in 
terms of crystallisation processes: as solid forms emerging from a fluid 
environment. Such a perspective traces politics in dynamic terms, exam-
ining how different actors – we refer to them as “political entrepreneurs” 
(Tilly 2003: 34) – work on different political realities as projects: how 
they construe and scheme political stability or instability, how they mo-
bilise popular support for regime sovereignty or for anti-government 
protests, and how they generally create contours in a fluid political field 
by crafting in-groups and out-groups.  
We will elaborate this perspective in three steps. The first section 
outlines the fluid urban environment as a political context, taking the 
case of Kisekka Market, a market for spare car parts in downtown Kam-
pala. At Kisekka, shopkeepers, hustlers, police spies, and middlemen are 
oftentimes unaware of who supports the opposition and who the gov-
ernment. While all are fated to interact with one another, politics remains 
within the realm of the intangible: less a matter of fixed and known 
identities than of dynamic and unknown identifications (see Brubaker 
and Cooper 2000). From this ambiguous context, however, highly unam-
biguous phenomena can emerge; Kisekka Market, for instance, has long 
been known (and stigmatised) for its protests and riots. In the second 
part of this article, we delineate how this transformation happens, or 
more generally, how political entrepreneurs attempt to turn a highly fluid 
environment into something concrete by sparking processes that engen-
der political alignments. The third section looks at police, arguing, maybe 
unconventionally, that the police work through similar dynamics as 
Kisekka Market. With their fluid borders and vast networks, police 
forces extend way into the civilian population and sometimes even 
overlap with the very opposition networks that they seek to control. 
1  The authors thank Anna Baral, Elísio Macamo, Mats Utas, Sverker Finnström, 
Anders Sjögren, and the lively and critical voices at the Nordic Africa Institute 
in Uppsala (where the paper was first presented) for their valuable input. Many 
thanks also go to the two anonymous reviewers at Africa Spectrum. 
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Moreover, since even the core of police is fraught with uncertainty and 
instability, the police are evidently part of what we call the “metastable 
city” – and to police it, they need to remain flexible and fluid while also 
creating or maintaining the impression of being a bounded state institu-
tion. Politics, from this perspective, is only secondarily about the conflict 
between a government and an opposition. Prior to this, and more fun-
damentally, it is about crafting concrete realities, groups, and movements 
that gather momentum and followers in a context of contingency and 
uncertainty (see Philipps 2016; Simone 2001; Utas 2012).  
This idea draws heavily on the philosophy of Gilbert Simondon 
(1958, 1989, 1995; see also Combes 2013), currently gaining popularity as 
a strong inspiration for the work of Gilles Deleuze.2 Simondon’s primary 
concern is to understand how phenomena emerge as distinguishable and 
tangible, a process he calls “individuation.” This process, he argues, is 
best understood as an interplay of innumerable factors that are intangible 
in their diversity and heterogeneity, but gradually develop into definite 
forms. Specific ideas, for example, emerge from relations between our 
subconscious and our consciousness that cannot be clearly defined 
(Lakoff and Johnson 2003); artefacts emerge from a variety of contexts 
(cultural, material, historical, technological, etc.) that are never conceiv-
able in their entirety (Burke 2002); and, to reiterate Simondon’s (1995: 
31) key metaphor, solid crystals emerge from a metastable solution that 
is initially fluid and intangible. African cities have widely been described 
in terms of similarly intangible relations by authors like Diouf (1996, 2003), 
Mbembe and Nuttall (2004), Pieterse (2011), and especially AbdouMaliq 
Simone (1998, 2001, 2003, 2004a, 2004b, 2008). Simone gives a captivat-
ing depiction of what one may call the metastable city: a space of poten-
tiality and spontaneous formations where economic pressures require 
that large numbers of individuals eking out a living take chances and 
spontaneously follow cues, intuitions, social ties, and dynamics without 
knowing where these dynamics may take them. In this context, uncer-
tainty is ubiquitous – as a constraint but also as a resource. As Simone 
(2008: 22) describes in the case of Bepanda Market in Douala, Came-
roon, uncertainty provides  
much room for dissimulation[,] much room for making things 
seem as if they are real when they are not, or making them real 
simply through the sheer mobilizing of money, interest, or sup-
port on the part of those schemed or part of making a scheme.  
2  We also relied on Combes’s (2013) English citations of Simondon, translated by 
Thomas LaMarre.  
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The metastable city can thus be characterised as a site of crystallisa-
tion, where vague and fluid ambiguities can be turned into concrete 
realities that people work and align with to probe into their potentiality 
(Cooper and Pratten 2015: 1; see also Newell 2012).3 In capital cities, 
such alignments easily gain an explicitly political character, for it is here 
where political power is continuously staged and attacked, solidified and 
undermined, through incessant negotiations of reciprocity and solidarity 
with the broader urban public (see Bekker and Therborn 2012; 
Christensen and Utas 2008; Diouf 1996, 2003; Utas 2012). To illustrate 
this rather abstract idea, we enter Kampala’s former Kisekka Market as 
an exemplary site of metastability.  
The Metastable City: The Case of
Kisekka Market  
A place of multiple interactions towards uncertain outcomes, of diverse 
activities and heterogeneous realities, Kisekka Market illustrates key 
features of the metastable city – all the more since it is also associated 
with Kampala’s most unambiguous protests and riots (see Goodfellow 
2013: 6-7). Up until 2014, when the market was demolished in order to 
be rebuilt, it is said (though this has not been confirmed) that major 
incidents of political violence were concentrated or spread from here. In 
2007 and 2008, riots erupted over the lease of the Kisekka Market land 
to a retired army colonel (see Goodfellow and Titeca 2012: 267). In Sep-
tember 2009, the Kayunga riots that spread throughout Kampala seemed 
to have sprung from Kisekka Market (Baral and Brisset-Foucault 2009; 
Branch and Mampilly 2015: 122; Golooba-Mutebi 2011: 10-11; Human 
Rights Watch 2010a), and since the massive 2011 Walk-to-Work protests 
(see Branch and Mampilly 2015), opposition politicians have frequently 
aroused militant support and sparked anti-government protests when 
appearing in the vicinity of the market.4 It is in that context that Kisekka 
Market had come to be known as, and stigmatised as, the “hotbed of riot-
ers and demonstrations in Kampala’s central business centre” (Mukisa 
3  As a theoretical side note, this inverts how we tend to think about hybridity (see 
Albrecht and Moe 2015): while hybridisation implies, quite controversially, that 
previously bounded entities turn into a less distinct mix, the idea of crystallisation 
sees the indistinct mix as a universal primary condition from which intelligible 
entities, i.e. realities, unfold in indeterminate ways. 
4  On the riots in Kampala and the institutionalisation of “noise” in Uganda’s urban 
politics, see Goodfellow (2013). 
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2014) – although, to reiterate, these riots were only a tiny fraction of what 
was going on at Kisekka Market, only a snippet of its diverse incidents, 
coincidences, and potentials.5 
Kisekka Market’s metastable character also bespeaks the ways in 
which the past routinely resurfaces in the present. Nowadays centrally 
located in downtown Kampala, the area of Kisekka Market used to be a 
swamp in the Kingdom of Buganda. As all land in Buganda, it was the 
king, the kabaka, who owned the land; still today, he is widely considered 
the Baganda’s landlord, an issue that we shall return to below. The mar-
ket emerged in the late 1980s as an informal trading spot for spare car 
parts, many of them stolen, exchanged, and sold through opaque net-
works associated with Uganda’s magendo underground economy (see 
Prunier 1983). In the early 1990s, 26 row houses were built to accommo-
date the ever-increasing workforce, estimated to be “at least 10,000 peo-
ple” in 2014 (Mukisa 2014), in a narrow space between Nakivubo Chan-
nel and Nakivubo Road. Since this space was inaccessible by car, the 
trades at Kisekka Market relied on middlemen. Hundreds, some say 
thousands, of brokers would intercept customers arriving by car at 
Nakivubo Road. They would negotiate a price and get the demanded 
spare part from inside the market, keeping the difference between the 
price they charged the customer and what they paid the shop owner. 
These could be substantial sums, given the high value of the traded 
goods and the ambiguity of prices. Customers, too, could profit from 
good deals if they had the right connections and a working knowledge of 
how Kisekka Market functioned. Much depended on being in the right 
networks, on being at the right place at the right time, and on being 
cunning enough to tilt the trades to one’s advantage. Such an aura of 
potentiality was not restricted to the hawkers, brokers, shopkeepers, 
dealers, mechanics, flows of customers, and hundreds of food vendors: 
many youth from the city’s outskirts would roam the market in search of 
random possibilities, action, and income, and interlocutors repeatedly 
emphasised that Kisekka Market attracted Kampala’s sharpest and 
toughest hustlers, widely known as bayaye (see Frankland 2007), looking 
not only for individual deals but for projects, ideas, and formations that 
could yield something.6 As one informant vaguely put it, “I won’t be 
5  Anna Baral’s insights from her ethnographic fieldwork at Kisekka Market have 
been helpful in this regard, all the more as she problematises rather than re-
traces the emergence of the market’s stigma as a hotbed of rioters.  
6  Interviews with Julius, 5 April 2014, Wabigalo, Kampala; Marc, 9 March 2014, 
Kazo, Kampala. The same goes for other markets and similar public spaces (see 
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paying anything, and I will be making something. […] So when some-
thing just comes up, you’re already tuned.” The second “something” 
refers here to riots and protests.  
The riots usually responded to previous political events in Kampala: 
arrests of opposition politicians such as Kizza Besigye and Erias Lukwago, 
election results that were suspected or proven to be fraudulent, contro-
versial legislative decisions and executive measures (see Goodfellow 
2014). Though each instance certainly featured specificities, market ven-
dors described a recurrent pattern of rioting over the past years: a small 
group would block Nakivubo Road, chant slogans, and sometimes ignite 
car tires, growing into a sizeable crowd that anticipated the arrival of 
police. Confrontations ensued between stone-throwing and sometimes 
looting protesters and anti-riot police using teargas, rubber bullets, ba-
tons, and water cannons. Such stand-offs could last several hours, as 
Kisekka Market’s dense architecture made it difficult for police to clear 
the space of protesters. With an audience of journalists filming the scene 
and onlookers from the surrounding “arcades” – multilevel buildings 
with additional shops that feature open facades and balconies – the con-
frontation between protesters and police was embedded in observation. 
Since the 2009 Buganda riots, which spread throughout the capital city 
and to other urban areas in central Uganda (Branch and Mampilly 2015: 
122), there was an anticipated potentiality that the upheavals could 
proliferate beyond the confines of Kisekka Market, both spatially and in 
the sense of building political momentum as a media phenomenon, 
through newspapers, television, and radio shows, through the radio trottoir 
(Ellis 1989), and through the Internet. During Uganda’s Walk-to-Work 
protests in 2011, for instance, online video snippets of the police’s vio-
lent arrest of opposition leader Kizza Besigye became an important fac-
tor for the movement gaining further momentum through an increasing 
focus on police brutality and the right to protest (see Baker 2015; 
Kagoro 2015a; Goodfellow 2013, 2014).7 Layer by layer, to draw on the 
crystallisation metaphor, the scope and significance of the event could 
thus evolve and change.  
Despite the recurrent patterns of rioting, their origins usually re-
mained opaque. Indeed, amongst all interviewees and informants for this 
research – including opposition activists, police spies and officials, deal-
ers at Kisekka Market, and investigative journalists – consensus was 
                                                                                                    
Frankland 2007). The names of all of Joschka Philipps’s interviewees and in-
formants have been anonymised.  
7  The incident happened not at Kisekka Market, however, but at the Mulago Hos-
pital roundabout.  
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restricted to the claim that the opposition had regularly given out money 
to spark riots, and that the government had paid money to impede them. 
Some argued that a clique in Kisekka Market’s Block A was in touch 
with the opposition; others hinted that the Bangawa group, a Baganda 
youth organisation based in and around Kisekka, were behind the large 
majority of riots happening at Kisekka. Most said the middlemen started 
the riots, but many others argued that rioters were mobilised from else-
where and had no relation to Kisekka Market. Several interviewees ar-
gued that the driving force behind the riots was Ganda ethnicity, while 
others emphasised urban youth unemployment and outrage against gov-
ernment impunity. Throughout the research, several of these claims 
could be partly verified, while none of them could be decisively refuted. 
Ambiguity persisted, and started at the individual level of who is who, 
and who is for whom at Kisekka. According to an anonymous police 
officer, there were between 500 and 1,000 police spies among the 10,000 
workers at Kisekka Market, and this was widely acknowledged by the 
dealers and brokers themselves.8 “Government spies are there,” one 
shopkeeper at Kisekka said. He went on:  
The people who came to work focused on getting money are there, 
everybody is there, [but] we don’t see – you don’t see where is which 
one or what”.9 
Relationships between shopkeepers and middlemen also oscillated be-
tween trust and mistrust. “They are all about survival,” one shopkeeper 
argued of the middlemen, “they work for you but they can also destroy 
you,” citing examples where looting and rioting middlemen had stolen 
from shopkeepers they had just dealt with hours before.10 In short, 
appearances could rarely be taken at face value, and the crucial concern 
in interactions was not necessarily what was real, but what could crystal-
lise into some beneficial reality to pursue.  
Ambiguity also pertained to the one thing that seemed beyond 
doubt at Kisekka Market: allegiance to the kabaka. Though almost every 
interviewee at Kisekka Market was quick to emphasise that “love for the 
kabaka is strongest here in Kisekka,” that “you can be killed for saying 
anything even slightly degrading about the king here” because “we see 
him as superior in all aspects,”11 the kabaka also remained, as an inform-
8  Interview with anonymous police officer, 22 March 2014, Kampala. 
9  Interview with Mohamed, 29 March 2014, Kisekka Market, Kampala.  
10  Interview with Ian and Daniel, 30 March 2014, Kisekka Market, Kampala.  
11  Interviews with Saadiq, 22–24 March 2014, Kisekka Market, Kampala.  
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ant would remark, “a mystery person.”12 Gerald, the informant, said 
most youth knew little about the king since he did not talk much in pub-
lic (see also Brisset-Foucault 2013b: 6). “Whatever we, the youth, know 
about the king, and whatever we believe in, stays what we believe in,” he 
said. Since the previous kabaka, Mutesa II, was exiled under the Obote 
regime, and the current kabaka, Mutebi II, was hindered by police from 
entering “his” territory of Kayunga District in 2009, the kabaka, to many, 
epitomised the oppressed dignity of the Kingdom of Buganda, which 
was continuously put down and ridiculed by a corrupt central govern-
ment (on the same narrative, see Mutibwa 1992, 2008). Love for the 
kabaka, then, could be more “political” than “ethnic,” more concerned 
with marginalisation and government corruption than with Ganda cul-
ture, and a vehicle of expression for multiple concerns, emotions, and 
positions.13 This was evidenced during the 2009 Kayunga riots, which 
followed the police’s interception of the kabaka at Kayunga District: 
surprisingly, a substantial number of rioters, possibly even the majority, 
were non-Baganda.14 Side by side with Baganda youth, they would chant 
slogans, loot, and attack military forces while some of their peers stopped 
and beat people who could not “walk like a Muganda” – meaning those 
who could not identify their lineage within the Baganda clan system. In the 
midst of highly heterogeneous and contradictory concerns and energies, 
along with a carnival of disparate forces, ethnicity emerged as an over-
arching conceptual frame to designate what is largely understood today as 
an ethnic riot, in which “the Baganda took to the streets of Kampala to 
protest the police action” (Baker 2015: 378; emphasis added).  
In a context where such highly contradictory dynamics can coalesce 
into such consistent representations, Simondon urges analysts not to sever 
the event from its representation, but to understand the event as a seed, 
around which further layers of representation crystallise. Since these layers 
may alter the form and significance of the initial event quite considerably, 
they are often deliberately crafted to pursue specific political agendas (see 
Philipps 2016). The NRM, for instance, benefitted tremendously from 
depicting the riots as an instance of “ethnic violence” to undermine Ganda 
opposition vis-à-vis the central government. As Goodfellow (2014: 13) 
notes, the government 
12  Interview with Gerald, 22 August 2013, Makindye, Kampala.  
13  For a strikingly similar case in Guinea-Conakry, see Philipps (2013a, 2013b).  
14  According to numerous interviews with police, less than half of the arrested 
suspects were Baganda. For instance, conversation with Moses Kafeero, who, at 
the time, was regional police commander of the Kampala Metropolitan Police, 
16 December 2015, Kampala.  
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lost no time in capitalizing on [the violence]. Officials declared 
that the riots had been planned by the Kingdom’s leaders, and be-
gan a clampdown on public space, arresting journalists accused of 
inciting the violence and closing CBS radio [Buganda’s main me-
dia institution], which was taken off air for a full year.15  
This leads us to outlining the politics of crystallisation in Kampala.  
The Politics of Crystallisation 
Though the concept is new, politics of crystallisation have been widely 
discussed in terms of framing, brokerage, boundary activation, and po-
larisation, most explicitly in McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly’s (2001) works 
on “dynamics of contention” (see also McAdam and Tarrow 2011; Snow 
et al. 1986; Tilly 2003, 2004). Even if the crystallisation approach is situ-
ated in quite a different theoretical tradition, it analyses similar phenom-
ena – for instance, how political entrepreneurs craft political groups and 
representations, and how these groups and representations serve as ref-
erence points in periods of contention. One key difference is that the 
crystallisation approach focuses specifically on how these contours 
emerge from a context of political opacity (Vigh 2015). It describes a 
process whereby a highly fluid environment becomes solidified into 
something concrete, whereby ambiguity is transformed into tangible 
realities. To Simondon (1958, 1989, 1995), this “individuation” process is 
universal: anything that is perceived as a concrete entity – a group, idea, 
or institution – is in fact the product of intangible and diverse relations. 
These intangible relations, in turn, only become perceptible through the 
things they produce. A plant, for instance, emerges from a relational 
process between sunlight and minerals in the ground. The relation be-
tween the sun and the minerals is usually intangible, but emerging from a 
seed, the plant absorbs these intangible relations and transforms them 
into a concrete form. An “individuated” entity thus “absorbs into itself 
the relation that gave rise to it, thus obscuring it” (Combes 2013: 16). 
Simondon therefore challenges us to approach anything – any event, 
phenomenon, or artefact – with the question of how it emerges from 
relations. It is in this sense that Simondon provides an analytical method 
as much as a theory, in which individuation constitutes a universal pro-
cess of becoming that can be retraced from a metastable milieu, through 
an induced seed, to an indeterminately crystallising phenomenon. Thus, 
as much as Kampala’s urban protests may seem particularly amenable to 
15  See also Baral and Brisset-Foucault (2009), Brisset-Foucault (2013a).  
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Simondon’s analytical framing, it needs to be emphasised that the crys-
tallisation metaphor originally relates to a much broader philosophical 
claim and easily applies to quite different phenomena as well. The pro-
cess of things going viral on the Internet, for instance, is another im-
portant case in point (see Nahon and Hemsley 2013).16  
The crystallisation approach advocated in this paper highlights the 
contingency and the unpredictability of such processes. Simondon’s 
analogy to the natural sciences notwithstanding, the approach also em-
phasises the importance of human agency (see also Emirbayer and 
Goldberg 2005; Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994; Emirbayer and Mische 
1998).17 In short, in a political context where it is particularly uncertain 
how things will play out, political actors will be all the more intent to 
strategically make things crystallise in their favour. To describe these 
politics of crystallisation, we focus on what Charles Tilly (2003) calls the 
“political entrepreneur”: a “transversal figure” (Wilson 2009: 16) who 
tries to carve out the contours of an initially fluid political field to gain 
political capital. As Tilly writes with regard to the conflict in former 
Yugoslavia:  
[Political entrepreneurs] specialize in activating (and sometimes de-
activating) boundaries, stories, and relations, as when Bosnian Serb 
leaders sharpened boundaries between Serbs and their Muslim or 
Croatian neighbors with whom Bosnians of Serbian lineage had 
long mingled, married, traded, and collaborated. They specialize in 
connecting (and sometimes disconnecting) distinct groups and net-
works, as when those same leaders integrated armed Serbian gangs 
into larger nationalist coalitions. They specialize in coordination, as 
when those leaders organized joint action on the part of those coa-
litions. Political entrepreneurs specialize, finally, in representation, as 
when Bosnian Serb leaders claimed to speak for all Bosnians of Ser-
bian lineage [...]. In these ways, political entrepreneurs wield signifi-
16  For the overall theoretical argument on social movements, protests, and riots in 
African Studies, see Philipps (2016). 
17  In this regard and many others, the crystallisation approach decidedly runs 
counter to Robert Kaplan’s The Coming Anarchy (1994). Though Kaplan uses a 
similar sort of “crystallisation” imagery (he likens West African young men to 
“loose molecules in a very unstable social fluid, a fluid that was clearly on the 
verge of igniting”), his perspective discards human agency as much as the 
open-endedness of history. Mainly intent on creating an apocalyptic image of 
the global future, Kaplan abuses “the experience of a number of African coun-
tries [as] merely a dress rehearsal for an ecological fate towards which humanity 
is ineluctably moving” (Mkandawire 2002: 183).  
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cant influence over the presence, absence, form, loci, and intensity 
of collective violence. (Tilly 2003: 34) 
Sam, who owned a shop at Kisekka Market, was a paradigmatic political 
entrepreneur from the opposition who tried to turn fluid dynamics into 
tangible events and political camps.18 An ambitious young politician who 
stood for a parliamentary seat, he had built diverse networks within three 
different opposition parties of which he was a member. Much of his 
political clout came from commanding a so-called youth brigade with a 
branch in Kisekka Market that could spread rumors, execute protests, 
blackmail political rivals, or confront police in favour of any politician 
who “gets a problem” and is willing to pay for its solution. He recounted 
stories of how he organised 30 of his Kisekka Market members into 
“command,” “information,” and “implementation” sections during the 
Kayunga riots, and mobilised urban Baganda youth by emphasising that 
“the government doesn’t like your king!” Another time, they staged a 
violent attack on an opposition politician, to then publicly allege that the 
perpetrators were government thugs. Once, they destroyed a public toilet 
to tell bystanders and residents that the government was going to tear 
down the informal settlements and build new houses in the area, spark-
ing protests against the Kampala Capital City Authority (KCCA). Once 
the information was out, it crystallised into a phenomenon, and had 
already gathered momentum by the time the KCCA dismissed the alle-
gations and rumours as false and fabricated.  
Media coverage was central in these schemes; the goal was to 
“throw information at the public eye,”19 possibly even vis-à-vis interna-
tional audiences and donors that both the regime and civil society heavily 
depended on (see Tangri and Mwenda 2006, 2010; Tripp 2010; Kagoro 
2015a).20 Both police and activists therefore informed and paid journal-
ists to report about the spectacle from a specific angle.21 A former 
opposition activist elaborated,  
And, the good thing, how all this [protest mobilisation] is 
achieved, is media. Cause we buy media. Guys buy the media, […] 
and the media reach the scene, very early enough and keep wait-
ing. Then they start filming. Police will start beating the [journal-
18  Interview with Sam, 15 October 2012, Makerere, Kampala.  
19  Interview with Sam, 15 October 2012, Makerere, Kampala. 
20  Interviews with various informants, e.g. Sam, 15 October 2012, Makerere, Kam-
pala; Dixon and Ron, 17 October 2012, Makerere, Kampala; Gerald, 4 October 
2012, downtown Kampala.  
21  Conversation with Gerald, 4 October 2012, Kampala.  
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ists], hé? Not to cover the event. They are calling the radio station. 
“Ahhh, police are running, roughing up, they are taking my cam-
era,” directly reporting [live], you get? So those on radio also tell 
others […]. By evening, the whole city is on fire.22 
External observation and media coverage was crucial in particular be-
cause of the observers’ partial knowledge of what was taking place – 
partial in terms of both its incompleteness and the political biases that 
would guide the observers’ interpretations of what they saw. Police and 
protesters actively appealed to that partiality: protesters would place 
women activists close to cameras to visualise their vulnerability;23 in 
front of other cameras, police commanders would explain the need to 
protect law-abiding citizens from irresponsible rabble-rousers. Journalists 
gravitated towards these different versions as avenues for advancement. 
“Everything is politicised,” said Daily Monitor journalist John Njoroge:  
You cannot get by, in Uganda, just by simply being the average per-
son. If you want to get ahead, you must affiliate yourself with some 
form of political persuasion.24  
These affiliations were neither long-term nor clear-cut, however, as many 
journalists took “sides” as those sides emerged, or, more precisely, as the 
journalists helped those sides emerge. After all, opposition and police 
emerged as two “sides” to a considerable degree through journalistic 
observation, through being seen and talked about as bounded groups 
from the outside. Just like during the 2009 Kayunga riots, where Ganda 
ethnicity was an attribute ascribed to the rioters rather than one the riot-
ers experienced, there are good reasons to believe that the groupness of 
government and opposition forces is at least as much a matter of outside 
attribution as of internal experience.  
Political entrepreneurs, who actively constructed what emerged as 
political realities, would accord rather little credibility to these construc-
tions themselves. Even when asked about his own youth brigade, Sam, the 
above-mentioned political entrepreneur, said dryly: “We use these youths. 
You know, we want power, we want to get legislative seats.” Many political 
entrepreneurs had worked for both the opposition and the NRM; some 
had switched sides multiple times during their career and some were 
working for both simultaneously. Although senior politicians shifted po-
litical sides as well – ex-PM Amama Mbabazi, who ran for president 
22  Interview with Dixon and Ron, 17 October 2012, Makerere, Kampala.  
23  Conversation with Gerald, 4 October 2012, Kampala.  
24  Interview with John Njoroge, 22 October 2012, Kampala. 
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against Museveni in 2016, is a noteworthy case in point – such dynamics 
were magnified amongst a large population of young urban graduates who 
aspired to a successful career. As most opportunities for professional and 
economic advancement depended on connections, and since the im-
portant nodal points were situated within the NRM government, which is 
close to synonymous with the state, many youth were almost inevitably 
drawn to these political networks and the enormous sums of money that 
circulated through them.25 Adam, a former youth mobiliser and protester 
for the Black Monday Movement in Kampala, for instance, had first reg-
istered with the NRM in 2006. “I realised that I cannot get anything if I am 
not with [the] NRM,” he said, and eventually worked his way up to be-
coming the NRM Youth League chairman in Kampala’s Makindye Dis-
trict. He left the NRM in 2011, disappointed in its system of ubiquitous 
nepotism in which he, as a fatherless young man with no family ties, was 
unable to advance. He recalled,  
People were wondering: Why are you running from where money is? And 
where are you going to go? And I was disturbed, really, [because] I never 
trusted in any opposition party.  
He then coordinated the Uganda Youth Platform, an opposition move-
ment by General Sejusa, the former coordinator of the intelligence ser-
vices under Museveni.  
Cross-cutting political boundaries was so entrenched that political 
entrepreneurs could coordinate and connive across the lines they would 
draw. Dixon, for instance, a police spy at Kisekka Market working for 
the inspector general of police, usually sought to prevent upheavals by 
channelling money to opposition groups who would otherwise organise 
riots.26 But when “things go sour at the end of the month,” he also 
collaborated with them:  
I’m broke, so I organize my gang […]. They tell him [the inspector 
general of police] all sorts of lies. That maybe the opposition to-
day approached us; they’re saying tomorrow we should go for this 
demonstration. So, chief will call me and say, “Dixon, you have to 
go to Kisekka and, you know, handle this situation.” And eventu-
ally he will give me some small money, I will also get my commis-
sion, I go and (laughing) meet my gangstas and give them some-
25  According to Andrew Mwenda (2011), the NRM spent an equivalent of USD 
350 million on the 2011 election campaign, which would amount to a per capita 
spending of approximately USD 10, dwarfing Barack Obama’s former record 
spending of USD 2.50 per American citizen in 2008.  
26  Interview with Dixon and Ron, 17 October 2012, Makerere, Kampala.  
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thing and we survive. Yeah, this is (pauses), basically, this is how our 
government has survived. For all these years!27  
In sum, uncertainty and ambiguity constituted a “productive resource” 
for political entrepreneurs (Cooper and Pratten 2015: 3), even vis-à-vis 
their bosses, as it allowed them to invent schemes and create realities, 
which they hoped would gather momentum. Such momentum depended 
on how different forces would react to a specific “seed” – for example, 
an event of public uproar – and political entrepreneurs prided them-
selves on knowing that very well. “I know youth politics, hé?” Ron said, 
having worked for both the opposition and the government: 
I know violence, how it comes up, hé? I know how opposition 
operates, and I know how government operates, properly! […] In 
this nation I know. 
Such knowledge was relative to a surrounding that political entrepre-
neurs tended to picture as comparatively naïve. Gerald, less self-confi-
dent than Ron, said, 
There are some things I understand. But I want to tell you that the 
youth who follow me, know absolutely little about so many things. 
About so many things. So, this person, if I decide to put something 
in him [an idea or a political affiliation], me, myself, I can.  
In a context of manipulable surroundings, then, the scope of schemes 
depended on how well connected a political entrepreneur was.28 Those 
able to draw from a broad range of connections could induce the most 
wide-ranging crystallisation processes, while others had to pitch their 
ideas to better-placed peers to benefit from their connections. For in-
stance, during the interview with Dixon, the police spy, his phones rang 
and vibrated incessantly. “You see my phones here?” he asked at some 
point. “I receive sooo many calls every day, these gangsters, whoever 
calling me […,] [I receive] soooo many ideas every day!” Asked to specify 
the kind of ideas, Dixon answered, “Blackmail” – threatening someone’s 
power by exposing subversive information. While the content of the 
information itself was comparatively negligible and oftentimes fabricated, 
the threat consisted of the expected effect – what would happen if the 
information gathered momentum.  
The NRM state was in a strikingly similar position: blackmailed on 
charges of corruption, which is common knowledge across the country, 
27  For a similar point on urban patronage politics in Kampala, see Goodfellow 
and Titeca (2012).  
28  On “connectionwork” in Kampala’s music industry, see Schneidermann (2014).  
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the subversive element was not the information that corruption existed 
but that frustrations about it gathered political momentum in large-scale 
protest. The question preoccupying Dixon was how long the govern-
ment could pay the ransom:  
The moment the government runs out of money, we get [it gets] 
scared, trust me: (whispering suspiciously) “Now, these people, criticising 
on the street, what shall we give them?” If there is no money?  
Indeed, it is in this context that the state has increasingly counted on 
police to handle the issue.  
Policing the Metastable City
Uganda’s police had long remained in the shadows of Museveni’s National 
Resistance Army (NRA). While the army embodied the Ugandan liber-
ation after the Bush War from 1981 to 1986, the police, adopted from the 
former Obote regime, were poorly equipped, notoriously underfunded, 
and unheeded in public. The fact that it is now a highly visible, well-
equipped, and equally prominent and controversial institution in Ugandan 
politics that no longer requires military assistance in anti-riot operations 
has a lot to do with the current inspector general of police (IGP), Kale 
Kayihura. Kayihura had joined Museveni in the Bush War in 1982 after 
completing his LLM at the London School of Economics, and was then 
appointed to lead sensitive operations in Congo and to conduct internal 
investigations. Kayihura became IGP in 2005, and the police’s manpower 
has increased enormously since then, from 8,000 in 2001 to an estimated 
60,000 today (Kagoro 2014: 120). From 2004 to 2014, the police budget 
grew from UGX 75 billion to 303 billion (i.e. from USD 22 million to 
90 million),29 the number of vehicles has mushroomed,30 and for the 2016 
elections period alone, police secured UGX 212 billion (USD 63 million) 
for mobilising, recruiting, training, and equipment purchases.31 Recently, 
29  See Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministerial Policy Statement FY 2013/2014. Pre-
sented to parliament for debate of estimates of revenue and expenditure by 
James Baba, minister of State for Internal Affairs, on 30 June 2013; 83–134.  
30  The number of armored personnel carriers (APCs) has grown from 0 to 30; 
patrol pickups (trucks) from 125 to 591; motorcycles from 0 to 3,556; and sa-
loon cars from 41 to 232. See Uganda Police Force Fleet Statistics FY 2003/2004–
2013/14.  
31  Kayihura also negotiated that police may retain all non-tax revenues such as 
traffic fines rather than remitting them to the Uganda Revenue Authority 
(URA) (see Kagoro 2014: 120).  
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the police established a new anti-riot division, the so-called Field Force 
Unit (see Baker 2015: 381–382), and in 2013 President Museveni signed 
the Public Order Management Bill, which gives police discretionary au-
thority to break up gatherings of as few as three people in a public arena 
who are deliberating political issues (Kagoro 2014: 114–115).  
Despite these legal-institutional instruments, the police tend to op-
erate not as a bounded institution but an open-ended network, defying 
distinctions as to who is in the police and who is not. Street kids indicate 
traffic offenders to policemen to later pocket a fraction of the bribe 
(“chai ”). Paramilitary youth brigades join police in ad-hoc anti-riot oper-
ations on the basis of personal and financial arrangements whose specif-
ics remain opaque to most of those involved.32 At police stations, infor-
mal middlemen, so-called kayungerizi, liaise constantly between police 
officers, suspects, and complainants in nebulous shuttle mediations 
about allegations, bribes, and brokerages. Akin to Kisekka Market, such 
jockeying involves a multiplicity of connections, phone calls to people of 
potential influence, some of them fake, some of them real, most of them 
transgressing institutional boundaries. Police actively engender such 
entanglements, and have amassed a plethora of informants, to the point 
where Kampala’s urbanites half-jokingly say that “if four people meet, 
you can be sure that one is a spy.”33 Just like during the Ugandan Bush 
War, when civilians were military-trained under “the democratisation of 
the gun” discourse to later participate in the removal of the Obote re-
gime (Mudoola 1991: 239; Museveni 2000: 80), and akin to the post-war 
nationwide mchaka-mchaka politico-military trainings of civilians that 
interlaced Ugandan society with a marked military ethos (Kagoro 2015b: 
183), current “crime preventer” trainings are turning millions of Ugan-
dan citizens into police partners, including for political mobilisation 
purposes on behalf of the ruling party.34 
One of the police’s greatest assets in the spy apparatus are boda-boda 
motorcycle taxi drivers. Estimated at 200,000 and continuously growing 
32  Interview with journalist Angelo Izama, 18 October 2012, Kisementi, Kampala.  
33  E.g. informal conversation with Adam at Kisekka Market, Kampala, 5 October 
2012.  
34  For more on crime preventers, see Moses Khiza, “Here is the absurdity of crime 
preventers.” In: The Observer, Kampala, 28 August 2015, online: <www.observer. 
ug/viewpoint/39546-here-is-the-absurdity-of-crime-preventers> (3 June 2016). 
See also “Crime preventers demand payment for Museveni Kololo rally, anti-
Mbabazi demo.” In: The Observer, Kampala, 6 November 2015, online: <www. 
observer.ug/news-headlines/40873-crime-preventers-demand-payment-for-mu 
seveni-kololo-rally-anti-mbabazi-demo> (3 June 2016). 
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in number,35 they are critical for Kampala’s traffic infrastructure and 
were long thought of as “raw material for the opposition.”36 They now 
constitute a main source of intelligence information for police, especially, 
in the IGP’s words, “to fight the opposition rioters who only want to 
destabilise the city.”37 The boda-boda drivers’ political affiliation shifted 
notably after the Kayunga riots, in which they featured prominently as 
protesters and mobile linkages between riot settings. Soon after the riots, 
IGP Kale Kayihura installed and co-opted the Boda-Boda 2010 Associa-
tion, organised the motorcycle trade with a company in India that sup-
plies motorcycles at a cheap price, and became the middleman between 
the boda-boda drivers and President Museveni. In 2010 Kampala’s boda-
boda leadership, headed by Abdallah Kitaka, was flown on the presiden-
tial jet to Arua, in northwestern Uganda, to meet Museveni, who later 
handed out more than 500 motorcycles for free and thousands more 
under favourable repayment plans. Today, innumerable boda-boda riders 
work closely with police, sometimes in arrests of suspected traffic of-
fenders, but mostly in the field of intelligence. Hundreds have undergone 
crime prevention trainings, including stripping and shooting AK47 guns, 
martial arts, and ideology classes. Boda-Boda 2010 Association offices 
are often painted yellow, the color of the ruling party, and feature pic-
tures of President Museveni, IGP Kale Kayihura, and the police’s former 
director of operations, Andrew Felix Kaweesi.38 Police are always invited 
to oversee elections of boda-boda leaders. 
Given these overall developments, the crystallisation of police may 
easily be misunderstood as an institutionalisation towards greater stabil-
ity, when in fact police, too, are inherently metastable – representing a 
fluid terrain whose inside and outside are constantly negotiated and 
blurred, where positions and alliances can shift overnight and turn into 
rivalries, contingent on myriad informal relations whose specifics remain 
opaque, and where money and spies, rather than securing control, am-
plify the agitation. For instance, senior officers recalled an incident where 
the director of the Kampala Metropolitan Police went to meet with the 
35  These figures were revealed during a meeting between the RPC Kawempe and 
all Kampala city division boda-boda chairmen held at Makerere, Kikoni on 26 
March 2015.  
36  Interview with a senior police officer at the rank of assistant inspector general 
of police (AIGP) and with a regional police commander, both in Kampala, on 
18 March 2015 and on 26 March 2015, respectively.  
37  Conversation with the IGP Kale Kayihura, 18 April 2015, Kololo, Kampala.  
38  Kaweesi is now the director of Human Resource Development. 
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National Forum of Crime Preventers, expecting to be received with due 
honour, when the crime preventers told him squarely, 
It is a good thing you have come, you did a good thing, because all 
those that did not come here to see us did not succeed, they were 
stripped of their jobs. Without us you can’t work in this city and 
we can cause your sacking.39  
As another senior officer intimated with respect to boda-boda riders,  
In 2011 after the presidential elections […,] I mobilised over 
20,000 boda-boda riders, gave them fuel [worth] 20,000 [shillings] 
each so that they can ride ahead of Mzee Museveni’s convoy to 
Kololo for the swearing-in ceremony. This of course would make 
it seem that the youth have been overwhelmingly and with enthu-
siasm behind the president. It would also make the function more 
colourful. But the boda-boda cannot be trusted 100 per cent; they 
are slippery characters. After escorting Mzee, they immediately 
turned their bikes to go and also pick [up] Besigye [the arch-rival 
of Museveni] from Entebbe Airport [Besigye was returning from 
Kenya where he had gone for treatment after the police had pep-
per-sprayed his face during a political rally], saying, “Oyo tumutusiza 
kati katu kime omulwadde.” [“Since we have safely escorted this one 
let us go and collect the one who is sick.”]40  
Added to the “slippery character” of the police’s supposed allies, subver-
sion may also come from within the police forces. A substantial minority 
of police personnel self-reported feeling “hostile to the sitting govern-
ment,” and disunity about the politicisation and militarisation of police 
exists amongst the highest echelons.41 Competition over better-paid 
posts, commonly referred as “wet” deployments, leads to diverse con-
flicts and rivalries. Influential officials are frequently blackmailed by their 
peers, and disgruntled Field Force Unit officers have even undermined 
anti-riot interventions by shooting tear gas canisters when the order had 
been not to, sometimes at schools or hospitals, to make their superiors 
lose their position.42 In that regard, protests not only emerge as an exter-
nal threat, but also trigger uncertainty within the police as to what will 
crystallise out of their own ranks. 
39  Interview with a senior police officer on 20 November 2015, Kampala.  
40  Interview with a senior police officer at the rank of AIGP, 12 March 2015 at 
Bukoto, Kampala. 
41  Interview with anonymous police officer, 22 March 2014 in Kampala.  
42  Interview with the AIGP held on 15 March 2015 in Wakiso. 
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At the same time, while the police’s own ranks can pose risks, the 
opposition can be won over. The IGP himself is known to frequently 
take rioting youth to his personal home in Muyenga to dissuade them 
from organising and participating in riots – offering tea and food, hand-
ing out money, promising development projects to individual ringleaders, 
integrating others into the spy apparatus, keeping them tied up in talks 
when they are supposed to be mobilising, and appealing to their hopes 
that they can make it within the current metastable order, and that they 
need to continue trying like everyone else. Ron, a former opposition 
mobiliser, when asked why he would stay with the IGP instead of mobi-
lising fellow protesters, exclaimed, 
This is the general who has called you, everything is there. He’s tell-
ing you how he used to do what you’re doing. […] Personal expe-
rience. [inaudible] That these [opposition] people are not going to 
help you, they are doing selfish businesses, you’re young, you lose 
your life. 
Ron later worked for the IGP himself: “He’s a nice person, this guy. He 
listens to you. If you have personal challenges, you seek something, he 
gives you money.”43 The IGP’s personal budget per quarter for such ad-
hoc purposes is now at UGX 3.6 billion (approximately USD 1 million), 
making him a key player in the urban politics of crystallisation.44  
Money, however, was only one way of silencing dissent. While police 
pay journalists who report favourably about their operations,45 they muzzle 
others whose reports may threaten the regime (Human Rights Watch 
2010b). In the wake of the 2009 Kayunga riots and “in addition to repress-
ing the demonstrations in the street, the state shut down four radio sta-
tions” and banned the so-called ebimeeza – open radio debates that had been 
key sites of political deliberation (see Brisset-Foucault 2013a: 241). Numer-
ous newspaper offices and radio stations have been raided and shut down 
over the years, and various journalists have been arrested, leading to 
considerable insecurity and precariousness amongst journalists without 
political protection (see Tripp 2010: 96-101). At the same time, many jour-
nalists seek such protection from police. Police headquarters are crowded 
with journalists who hope to establish good relations with influential offic-
ers, to have a number to call in difficult situations, but also to get the latest 
news, a fuel card, or UGX 100,000 for positive coverage. This goes for 
journalists from both private and state-owned media, as Uganda’s media 
43  Interview with Ron, Kampala, 16 March 2014.  
44  Personal conversations with senior officers.  
45  Ethnographic observations by Jude Kagoro.  
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outlets tend to defy the idea of stable political camps. Journalists from the 
state-owned New Vision newspaper, for instance, might be critical of police, 
while the previously police-raided Independent news magazine might be full 
of praise, due to a diverse range of favours, threats, personal rivalries, and 
other contingencies.  
An important upshot from this discussion on police is that any 
crystallising entity in a metastable context must maintain responsiveness 
to change and uncertainty. Just like the Boda-Boda 2010 Association or 
different media outlets, police were forced to become neither too stable, 
bounded, or paralysed in an ever-shifting environment, nor too unstable, 
fluid, or indistinguishable from that environment. While ensuring visibil-
ity as a distinct institution, police also connived with boda-boda drivers, 
some of whom had been involved in anti-government protests, some of 
whom still were, and some of whom sympathised with the protests, but 
would argue that “the difference between the government and the oppo-
sition is that the opposition doesn’t have power. That’s all.”46  
Conclusion 
Thinking through these dynamics of protest and policing in Kampala in 
terms of stable political camps, where a bounded opposition stands 
against a bounded government or state apparatus, ignores both the rela-
tions that transgress these boundaries and the shifting political positions 
between these camps. Though political camps do obviously exist in 
Kampala, this paper has suggested treating them not as structures, not as 
a priori, permanent, and definitive parameters of agency, but as emerging 
fields of gravity once a protest, riot, or any other “seed” transforms the 
metastable milieu into an antipodal political spectrum. This process is 
akin to what Brubaker (2002) has argued about ethnicity and the for-
mation of ethnic groups. Brubaker, who notably defines ethnicity as a 
“crystallization of group feeling” (2002: 167), rejects the concept of 
“ethnic groups” because it presupposes the “groupness,” whose genesis 
the analyst is actually supposed to account for (2002: 176). Since ethnic-
ity is contextually fluctuating, waxing and waning over time, and often-
times a corollary of conflict rather than the underlying cause of it, it 
should be thought of as a project or an event rather than a collective 
entity: schemed by political entrepreneurs, solidified through external 
representation by media, and self-perpetuating as it crystallises (Brubaker 
2002: 168).  
46  Interview with Lawrence, boda-boda driver, 22 February 2014, Kololo, Kampala.  
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In this paper, we applied a similar idea to opposition and govern-
ment forces in Kampala, outlining how political entrepreneurs construe 
situations through which opposition and government forces emerge as 
bounded entities that people gravitate towards. Since such gravitation 
processes are essential for party politics to work, the incentives to incite 
them are by no means restricted to the Ugandan opposition. The NRM, 
too, capitalises profoundly on events that polarise and make the opposi-
tion visible as a threat to the regime – especially when these events are 
violent. Indeed, the NRM has long benefitted from security threats to 
expand its military apparatus and present itself as the only alternative to 
violence and mayhem (Baker 2015; Branch and Mampilly 2015). As 
Goodfellow (2014) has shown in a variety of cases, NRM politicians 
have in recent years strategically stirred up legislative debates whose main 
effects were political unrest and state crackdown. Rather than trying to 
implement the debated laws – which appeared to be a secondary concern 
at best – the NRM used the violence they provoked as a motive to 
criminalise the opposition, demonstrate the regime’s dominance, and 
justify further “legal maneuvers” that restricted political space and “did 
little to ease underlying tensions” (Goodfellow 2014: 2).47  
Designating the Ugandan state as “politically stable” or “politically 
unstable” becomes problematic in this context, not only because both 
are simultaneously true (cf. Tripp 2010). Rather, it is problematic because 
such designations tend to absorb the very processes that they refer to, 
the whole gamut of politicking that goes into crafting the “stable” or the 
“unstable” state, the actual making of politics as they appear. To account 
for these processes, Simondon’s framework provides a rich set of 
instruments that can be applied to matters far beyond the question of 
urban politics in Kampala. One is Simondon’s idea of the pre-individual, 
metastable realm. Put simply, one could think of the metastable realm as 
a truly empirical world that is inconceivable because it is not yet con-
ceptualised, not yet divided into distinct phenomena that one could de-
scribe, assess, and evaluate. Additionally, this idea implies that the emer-
gence of any conceivable reality from the metastable realm is contingent 
on the different interests of those who partake in defining its contours, 
and thus inevitably controversial, as we elaborated in the “politics of 
crystallisation” section. Related to that, Simondon’s framework hints at 
the need for a self-reflexive understanding of how our analytical con-
cepts also work as agents of crystallisation (Brubaker and Cooper 2000; 
47  In a context of allegedly ubiquitous security threats, such a political strategy is 
clearly of global concern.  
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Combes 2013; Lakoff and Johnson 2003). A concept like “police,” as we 
have shown in the final section, bundles a diversity of oftentimes incon-
gruous elements into something homogeneous and perceptible, for bet-
ter or for worse, and scholars face the complex challenge of finding 
methods and languages that account for what gets lost in that process. 
AbdouMaliq Simone’s work on urbanity remains noteworthy in this 
regard, as he refrains from fixing and determining what he describes, and 
instead highlights and performs interdependences and elusiveness. As 
Simone said in a recent interview, “I guess what has always interested me 
about urban life is that aspect which it refuses to be folded into” 
(Philipps 2015: 58).  
The crystallisation approach, finally, aside from lending itself to in-
vestigating the metastable city as experienced by its residents (Simone 
2014: 4), or to scrutinising protest movements (Philipps 2016), encour-
ages analysts to reconstruct the crystallisation of realities about African 
politics that emerge in a rather top-down fashion. Indices used in global 
governance, such as the Fragile States Index,48 are a crucial case in point 
(see Merry, Davis, and Kingsbury 2015). Widely accepted and used as 
objective measurements, indices construe “easily digestible” realities 
(The Fund for Peace 2016) from exceedingly more complex national 
contexts, which these indices hierarchise according to standards mostly 
set in the Global North – with marked effects on governance (Cooley 
and Snyder 2015; Merry 2011; see also Jerven 2013, 2015). A Simon-
donian “politics of crystallisation” approach would problematise, but 
also retrace how such indices work. As regards the Fragile States Index, 
such an approach would, for instance, question the idea of political 
(in)stability as the aggregate sum of standardised indicators and, with 
that, the index’s ability to perform an “early warning” function on that 
basis (The Fund for Peace 2016). The so-called “Arab Spring” has amply 
manifested how contentious politics can crystallise unpredictably, in 
unlikely settings and in unforeseeable ways, and how they can destabilise 
states across and beyond the MENA region, which the Fragile States 
Index and other “expert institutions” had ranked as comparatively stable 
at the time (The Fund for Peace 2011; see also Philipps 2016). Neverthe-
less, as indicators provide “a transition from ambiguity to certainty” (Merry 
48  The Fragile States Index, which until 2014 used to be called the Failed States 
Index, has been published annually since 2005 by the American think tank The 
Fund for Peace and the journal Foreign Policy. It is based on 12 social, economic, 
and political indicators, each with an average of 14 sub-indicators. Criticisms of 
the index abound. See, e.g., Beehner and Young (2012); Evers (2014); Leigh 
(2012).  
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2011: S88), the crystallisation framework is well equipped to also retrace 
and retrieve the diverse processes and relations that indicators absorb, 
and to explore the functions of indices at the nexus of global politics and 
knowledge production. As such, Simondon’s theoretical apparatus pro-
vides valuable tools for both classic empirical analyses and critical reflec-
tions on African politics as an object of knowledge.  
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Die metastabile Stadt und die Politik der Kristallisierung:  
Protest und Polizei in Kampala 
Zusammenfassung: Wenn in der Innenstadt Kampalas Unruhen ausbre-
chen, entstehen in einem dynamischen Prozess geschlossene politische 
Lager, und aus einer Vielzahl unterschiedlicher Anliegen werden ver-
gleichsweise festumrissene politische Forderungen. Die Autoren des vor-
liegenden Beitrags zeichnen diesen Wandel nach und deuten das politische 
Geschehen in Kampala als Politik der Kristallisierung: als Versuch, aus 
äußerst fluiden Bewegungen feste Strukturen zu machen. Ihre Analyse 
basiert auf ethnographischer Feldforschung und Interviews mit Aktivisten 
der Opposition und Angehörigen der Polizei. So sehr beide Formationen 
versuchen, Menschen auf ihre Seite zu ziehen, so wenig sind sie im städti-
schen Alltag voneinander abgegrenzt. Individuen bewegen sich mitunter 
auf beiden Seiten der politischen Grenzlinien und suchen die Kooperation. 
Das nationale Regime und die Opposition stehen sich nicht als perma-
nente stabile Strukturen gegenüber, sondern als Gravitationsfelder, deren 
Entstehen angeheizt und unterdrückt, finanziert und kontrolliert wird. 
Unter Bezugnahme auf Gilbert Simondons Theorie der Individuation und 
AbdouMaliq Simones Arbeiten zu Urbanität versuchen die Autoren, städ-
tischen Widerstand und staatliche Kontrolle dynamisch zu erfassen und 
auf diese Weise eine neue Interpretation afrikanischer Politik anzuregen. 
Schlagwörter: Uganda, Kampala, Politischer Protest, Macht und Herr-
schaft, Polizei, Gilbert Simondon 
